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For and Against Brexit: A Survey Experiment of the
Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes
toward EU Membership
MATTHEW GOODWIN, SIMON HIX AND MARK PICKUP*
What are the lessons of the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union (EU) regarding
the effects of message framing? This article reports ﬁndings from an innovative online survey experiment
based on a two-wave panel design. The ﬁndings show that, despite the expectation that campaign effects
are generally small for high-salience issues – such as Brexit – the potential for campaign effects was high
for the pro-EU frames. This suggests that within an asymmetrical information environment – in which
the arguments for one side of an issue (anti-EU) are ‘priced in’, while arguments for the other side
(pro-EU) have been understated – the potential for campaign effects in a single direction are substantial.
To the extent that this environment is reﬂected in other referendum campaigns, the potential effect of
pro-EU frames may be substantial.
Keywords: Brexit; experiment; European Union/EU; framing; campaigns
Referendums on a country’s relations with the European Union (EU) are relatively common. The
23 June 2016 referendum on whether the United Kingdom should remain in or leave the EU was
the 55th such referendum in Europe since 1972, and the 30th since 2000. In some respects, the
UK’s ‘remain-or-leave’ referendum was similar to other recent EU referendums.1 The vote was
triggered by a party in government that was divided on Europe. Whereas most centrist voters
generally supported the pro-EU side, most voters on the radical right and a signiﬁcant portion on
the radical left supported the anti-EU side. The referendum was also preceded by growing public
support for a radical right and ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party, the UK Independence Party (UKIP).2
In other respects, though, the 2016 UK referendum was different. Whereas most other EU
referendums have been on reforms of the EU treaties, or on whether a country should join the
EU or adopt the euro single currency, the 2016 referendum was only the third on whether a
country should remain in or leave the EU. The only other such ‘high-stakes’ referendums were
an earlier referendum in the UK, in 1975, when 67 per cent voted to stay in the then European
Communities, and the Greenland referendum in 1982, when 54 per cent opted to leave the
European Communities. Following the UK 2016 referendum, though, we may see similar
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in/out referendums in other member states. Several radical right parties in other EU states are
campaigning for a ‘Cameron-style’ referendum, for example.
We use the 2016 referendum to achieve two broad goals. First, we test theories of campaign
effects in a context that is extraordinary from the perspective of most persuasion and framing studies,
which typically focus on low-salience issues.3 This may be explained by the fact that persuasion and
framing affects are expected to be weak for long-standing issues on which individuals have been
given the time and information necessary to form and solidify their opinions.4 Little opinion change
is expected for crystallized attitudes.5 Leaving or remaining in the EU is the type of high-salience
issue for which we would expect crystallized attitudes and weak campaign effects. Even before the
referendum, voters considered the issue of Europe and the UK’s EU membership to be the leading
issue facing the country.6 However, the UK referendum also represented a situation where
substantial campaign effects were possible, because of the information asymmetry that existed prior
to the campaign. On the one hand, before the referendum campaign, consumers of UK media had
been exposed to at least forty years of Eurosceptic coverage.7 Public concern over immigration and
dissatisfaction with established politics had been targeted by UKIP, which won the 2014 European
Parliament elections and secured nearly 13 per cent of the vote in the 2015 general election.8 On the
other hand, arguments regarding the positive effects of EU membership were far less prominent as
they received a fraction of the media attention. This created a situation in which argument frames
that emphasized previously under-stressed considerations might have had an effect despite the high
salience of the issue. It is particularly unusual that positive – but not negative – messages had the
potential to inﬂuence opinions. Negativity bias usually leads to greater mental attention to negative
arguments relative to positive ones, leading to larger persuasion and framing effects.9
Persuasion and framing effects in the context of the 2016 referendum may also have been
larger than expected due to weak partisan cuing. When an issue is highly salient, each political
party typically takes a clear position. When this happens, it is difﬁcult to move partisans away
from their partisan-consistent position. Hence, both persuasion and framing effects are expected
to be small or non-existent. Yet the 2016 Brexit referendum represented an unusual situation in
which cues from the two major parties were unclear. Longstanding divisions within the
incumbent Conservative Party were reﬂected in the fact that while 185 Conservative MPs
campaigned for ‘Remain’, 138 declared support for ‘Leave’. This divide extended to the very
top of the party, as at least six Cabinet ministers campaigned for Leave, including the Mayor of
London and Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Boris Johnson and Justice Secretary
Michael Gove, alongside the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, and ten Labour MPs.10 While an
overwhelming majority of Labour MPs were remain supporters, the party leader, Jeremy
Corbyn, was lukewarm in his support, both because he was known to be critical of the EU and
because he did not want to be seen to support the Cameron government. As a result, at the
3 Hopkins and Mummolo 2017.
4 Zaller 1992.
5 Chong and Druckman 2010; Tesler 2015.
6 Data from the Ipsos-MORI Issues Index tracker. Available at https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/eu-
and-brexit-seen-most-important-issue-facing-britain?language_content_entity=en-uk (accessed 17 July 2017).
7 Daddow 2012.
8 Goodwin and Milazzo 2015.
9 Soroka 2014.
10 The estimates of how MPs and ministers voted is taken from ‘EU vote: Where the cabinet and other MPs
stand’, BBC News, 22 June 2016. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946
(accessed 3 January 2017).
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beginning of the campaign, which is when we undertook our study, the Labour leadership’s
position was unclear.
In sum, the context of the 2016 EU referendum in the UK allows us to test persuasion and
framing effects in a context in which the high salience of the issue would typically lead us to
expect little to no effects, particularly for positive arguments, but the information asymmetry
and the weak partisan cues of the environment lead us to expect strong effects. This is an
atypical situation in which to test persuasion and framing effects, and leads to some unique
theoretical expectations. Empirically testing these expectations provides a strong test of what we
believe we know about campaign effects.
Even though the context of the Brexit referendum is extraordinary from the perspective of
testing campaign effects, it does have some features in common with possible future in/out
referendums. This allows us to achieve a second goal: to study the power of arguments used in
the UK referendum to shed light not only on what happened in 2016 but also on what could
happen in similar referendums in the future. In particular, our context allows us to examine
whether relatively unfamiliar ‘pro-EU’ arguments that stress the beneﬁts of EU membership can
sway public attitudes in the face of well-established ‘anti-EU’ arguments that have been
prominent in the UK and other EU nations.
We pursue these two goals via an online survey experiment, conducted between September
and November 2015, just before the ofﬁcial referendum campaign began. The experiment
included two innovative elements. First, it was designed to allow us to test the effects of
different combinations of real-world arguments against each other during an actual campaign on
public support for leaving/remaining in the EU. Secondly, the experiment was based on a
‘before and after’ design, using a two-wave panel, which allows us to examine how individuals
changed their opinions in response to a set of arguments. In the next section we set out our
theoretical expectations, after which we explain the design of our experiment and present the
results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for the campaign
effects literature and for future referendums.
Our main ﬁndings are that: (1) ‘pro-EU’ arguments on their own (could have) signiﬁcantly
increased support for remaining in the EU while ‘anti-EU’ arguments, which for decades have
dominated the political and media debate about EU membership, and which we suggest were
therefore ‘priced in’, had less potential to impact support for either side; (2) the effect of pro-EU
arguments was mitigated when contrasted with anti-EU arguments, limiting the potential
effectiveness of pro-EU arguments in an environment of competing pro-/anti-messages; (3) the
effect of both pro- and anti-EU arguments was greatest among those whose prior beliefs were
consistent with the argument and (4) the effect of pro-EU arguments was greatest among those
with lower political knowledge (less education).
THEORY
Media, politicians and campaigns can portray information in different ways, stressing certain
evaluations or parts of an argument.11 Our research on the effect of different arguments on EU
membership is rooted in existing research on persuasion, and how the ‘framing’ of issues can
affect public opinion and vote choices generally, as well as research on how such framing can
shape attitudes towards the EU speciﬁcally.
It is well established in political science that frames select and organize information on issues,
give meaning, attribute positive or negative values, and can inﬂuence attitudes. Frames supply a
11 Schuck and de Vreese 2006.
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readily comprehensible basis on which to think about the issue and how to justify what should
be done about it.12 A framing effect occurs when individuals who are exposed to different
frames arrive at different positions on the issue, depending on the priority given to various
considerations in the frame; effects can also be persistent.13
When we consider the effects of different arguments that are made for remaining in or leaving
the EU, we view these arguments as frames and are interested in the effects of the different
considerations raised in the different frames.14 There are a number of psychological processes
that determine whether a consideration has an effect on opinion. In testing the effects of
different arguments, we manipulate two of these: availability and accessibility.15 For a
consideration to have an effect, it must be available in an individual’s memory and it must be
accessible (front of mind) to be applied to the current situation.
Framing studies typically argue that they manipulate the accessibility of different
considerations by presenting research participants with different arguments.16 However, there
exists a debate about whether these framing studies manipulate the availability or accessibility
of considerations. That is, whether exposing individuals to frames makes new information
available or makes information that was already available to them accessible.17 The effect of the
latter (accessibility) is typically considered a framing effect and that of the former (availability)
a persuasion effect. We remain somewhat agnostic about this distinction, and argue that when
we expose respondents to our frames, this has the potential to make both new information
available and pre-existing information accessible. Given the salience of the issue of remaining
in or leaving the EU leading up to the referendum, we expect that most arguments were already
available and our arguments primarily manipulated accessibility. In other words, any detected
effects are framing effects. However, given the pre-existing asymmetry in the volume of claims
made regarding the negative and positive consequences of remaining in the EU, it is possible
that the pro-EU arguments increased availability. In other words, pro-EU arguments may have
also produced a persuasion effect.
Consistent with a campaign in which two camps advocate diametrically opposed positions
(that is, whether to remain in, or leave, the EU), we view the relevant arguments as ‘valence
frames’. As Lecheler and de Vreese observe, this valence alludes to one of the most
fundamental aspects of political discourse, namely that political elites try to inﬂuence public
reactions to an issue by emphasizing the positive or negative aspects of it, such as the positive or
negative features of EU membership.18 As past studies observe, with regard to framing and the
EU, ‘[t]he basic ﬁnding of two decades of research is that political communications that frame
European integration in terms of its beneﬁts increase public support for European integration,
while messages that frame it in terms of costs, risks or cultural threats lower support for
European integration’.19
Indeed, a growing number of experimental studies investigate frames as they relate to EU
issues and how they affect public attitudes. Abbarno and Zapryanova randomly exposed
respondents in the UK and Bulgaria to a ‘cultural threat’ or ‘democratic deﬁcit’ frame, and
12 Sniderman and Theriault 2004.
13 Druckman and Nelson (2003, 730); on frame persistence, see Lecheler and de Vreese (2011).
14 Chong and Druckman 2007; see also Berinsky and Kinder 2006.
15 Bless, Fielder, and Strack 2004.
16 Chong and Druckman 2007.
17 Leeper and Slothuus 2015; Lenz 2009.
18 de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2003; Lecheler and de Vreese 2011.
19 Abbarno and Zapryanova 2013, 583; also see de Vreese 2004; de Vreese 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007;
Medrano 2003; Schuck and de Vreese 2006.
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found that both reduced support for EU integration.20 Schuck and de Vreese demonstrate how
news media frequently use ‘risk’ and ‘opportunity’ frames when discussing the issue of EU
enlargement, frames that are shown to have signiﬁcant effects on citizens that are, in turn,
moderated by political knowledge.21 Studying attitudes toward Turkey’s possible EU
membership, de Vreese et al. show how negative frames yielded stronger effects than
positive frames, though more politically sophisticated citizens were more affected by positive
frames, providing some evidence that attitudes can be shaped by the framing of the issue in
interaction with individual characteristics.22 Overall, pro- and anti-EU economic, cultural and
political frames have the potential to increase or decrease support for remaining in the EU.
The magnitude of a framing effect depends on the context. We argue that one way in which
context matters is that if certain considerations are already highly available and accessible to the
individual, exposure to frames that contain those considerations will have little effect. Under
such circumstances, those considerations are already ‘priced in’ – already accessible and
available. This is particularly relevant to a situation in which one side of an argument may have
dominated the dialogue for an extended period of time. Given Britain’s long tradition of
Euroscepticism, we expect that new pro-EU frames that are not ‘priced in’ to the debate will
have a greater effect on vote choice than older and more familiar anti-EU frames. On that basis,
we hypothesize that pro-EU frames will increase support for remaining in the EU while anti-EU
frames will have little effect.
Another way in which context could matter is particularly relevant to a campaign in which
two opposing sides make competing claims. The effect of a frame may differ depending upon
whether the individual is simultaneously being exposed to competing frames. When individuals
receive competing frames, they may choose the side that is consistent with their prior beliefs.23
However, if an individual contrasts competing frames, this can cause him or her to take an
intermediate position. The effect of one frame is mitigated by the opposing frame, resulting in
weak effects.24 We anticipate that both of these effects are relevant. We hypothesize that
exposure to competing frames mitigates the effects of framing. At the same time, frames will
have stronger effects if they are consistent with prior beliefs.25 Therefore, we hypothesize that
pro-EU frames will be more effective among people who previously expressed positive EU
sentiment and/or those who identify as Labour supporters, while anti-EU frames will be more
effective among people who previously expressed negative EU sentiment and/or who are
Conservative identiﬁers.26
The magnitude of a framing effect also depends on other characteristics of the recipient of the
frame. Consistent with extant research, we expect that exposure to frames will have stronger
effects on the less knowledgeable by making considerations available and accessible that were
previously not accessible, something found in studies of framing and EU issues.27 Among the
more knowledgeable these considerations are likely to already be highly available and
accessible, and so little effect is expected from exposure to frames that contain these
considerations. Lecheler and de Vreese28 ﬁnd evidence of this type of moderating effect for
20 Abbarno and Zapryanova 2013; cf. McLaren 2002; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2012.
21 Schuck and de Vreese 2006.
22 de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2011.
23 Sniderman and Theriault 2004.
24 See Chong and Druckman 2007.
25 Druckman 2001.
26 Hobolt 2007; Van Elsas and Van Der Brug 2015.
27 See Chong and Druckman (2007, 639); in terms of EU issues see Schuck and de Vreese (2006).
28 Lecheler and de Vreese 2010.
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knowledge when examining the effects of news framing on support for EU enlargement. Using
education as a proxy for knowledge,29 we hypothesize that framing effects will be stronger
among the less educated.
This consequently leads us to the following hypotheses:
1. Anti-EU frames, which are likely to already be highly available and accessible (priced in),
will have less of an effect than pro-EU frames.
2. In a context in which there are competing frames, the effect of each frame will be mitigated,
resulting in weak effects.
3. Frames consistent with prior beliefs will have stronger effects.
4. The effect of frames will be greatest on those with less knowledge/education.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We test these hypotheses in an innovative, online population-based experiment that combines
the strengths of laboratory experiments and national surveys.30 By randomly assigning a sample
of the adult population to different treatments we can identify the causal effects of being
exposed to different types of arguments on support for EU membership. Conducting our
experiment on a sample designed to reﬂect the national population, we can also estimate the
magnitude of these effects on the population as a whole.31
The experiment was designed to simulate the ‘real-world’ campaign environment by
exposing respondents to a combination of different frames, in the form of vignettes, about the
UK’s EU membership, and which they might realistically receive in the referendum campaign,
due to start shortly after our experiment. Our experiment reﬂects the real world in two ways.
First, we use vignettes that include competing frames with different vignettes placing different
weights on the two sides of the argument. Chong and Druckman32 note that there is little
literature on the effect of competing frames. Sniderman and Theriault, and Brewer and Gross33
examine competing frames but only with equal exposure to both. Of course, in reality
arguments are rarely equal in exposure. Secondly, our experimental vignettes were inspired by
real-world arguments used by the two sides of the debate only a few months before the
referendum. Following past research on the effect of information on EU attitudes,34 our
vignettes include cultural, economic and political messages. Also following past research35
these messages were based on leaﬂets, speeches or websites associated with the pro-EU/Remain
or the anti-EU/Leave campaigns, thereby maximizing the generalizability of the results to the
referendum. The arguments were tailored so that the length of each was approximately equal
with roughly equivalent amounts of information. The primary variation across treatments was
the direction of the argument (that is, pro-EU or anti-EU) rather than the amount of information.
Our vignettes purposely did not include the source of the considerations presented. This allowed
29 Carpini and Keeter 1997; Luskin 1990.
30 Mutz 2011.
31 Previous studies that use an experimental design to study EU attitudes include: Maier and Rittberger (2008);
Schuck and de Vreese (2011) who use lab experiments; Abbarno and Zapryanova (2013); Adriaansen, van Praag
and de Vreese (2012); Bruter (2009); Kumlin (2011); Lecheler and de Vreese (2010); and Schuck and de Vreese
(2012), who used survey experiments. De Vreese (2004) used a two-wave framing experiment.
32 Chong and Druckman 2007.
33 Brewer and Gross 2005; Sniderman and Theriault 2004.
34 Maier and Rittberger 2008.
35 Maier et al 2012.
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us to estimate the effects of the considerations uncontaminated by cueing from the source. The
vignettes are shown in Appendix I.
Our experiment used a 2 × 2 × 2 full factorial design, in which each respondent was exposed
to a vignette composed of: (1) a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ EU cultural frame; plus (2) a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ EU
economic frame; plus (3) a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ EU political frame. One-ninth of respondents were
assigned to each of the eight possible treatment groups and one-ninth was assigned to a control
group, which was not exposed to a vignette.36 Because every treatment contains three frames,
we are able to estimate the impact of different combinations of arguments holding the number of
frames constant.
The full factorial design allows us to estimate the effect of: arguments containing frames all in
the same direction (all pro- or all anti-EU); arguments with competing frames (some pro- and
some anti-EU); and arguments with different weights placed on the two sides (a varying number
of pro-EU and anti-EU arguments). This, in turn, allows us to test our hypotheses regarding the
effects of different types and combinations of frames. The experiment was conducted before the
date of the referendum was conﬁrmed and the conclusion of EU reform negotiations, hence
minimizing external contamination.
The population-based experiment was conducted as a two-wave panel study conducted by
YouGov. The ﬁrst wave was conducted between 24 September and 1 October 2015 and the
second wave was conducted two weeks later between 16 October and 9 November 2015. The
ﬁrst wave included 6,074 completions. With a retention rate of 87.8 per cent, the second wave
sample included 5,333 respondents, with approximately 590 respondents per group.37 Further
information about the sample, including balance tests, can be found in Appendix II. Once data
were collected we proceeded with a difference-in-differences analysis. This allows us to
estimate the average change in referendum vote intention before and after exposure to a vignette
for individuals in the eight treatment groups (the eight argument combinations) compared to the
change in referendum vote intention for individuals in the control group.
In the ﬁrst wave, vote intention was measured using a standard referendum voting intention
question: ‘How would you vote if the referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU were held
tomorrow? (Remain in the EU/Leave the EU/Don’t Know)’. In the second wave, respondents
were assigned to one of the vignettes (eight treatment groups) or to the control group.
Respondents were then immediately asked the same vote intention question.
The panel structure allows us to measure referendum vote intention before and after exposure
to the vignettes. This provides us with a within-subject design, allowing us to estimate the
change in opinion, for each individual, due to exposure to a vignette relative to those who were
not exposed to a vignette (the control group). For example, we estimate the average change in
referendum vote intention for individuals exposed to a vignette with three pro-EU frames
compared to the change in referendum vote intention for individuals in the control group. We
also did this for individuals exposed to vignettes with the following combination of arguments:
two pro/one anti, one pro/two anti and three anti. The within-subject design also provides
greater power to determine the effects than a between-subjects design.38
36 In our design, each respondent is assigned to only one treatment (or to the control group), unlike a conjoint
design, in which the individual is exposed to a series of treatments. Such a design would be inappropriate for our
purposes as the vignettes do not reference a hypothetical and so once a respondent is exposed to one vignette, we
cannot reasonably ask them to forget the arguments to which they were just exposed in order to determine the
effect of exposing them to a new vignette.
37 Group sizes range from 551 to 652. See Appendix Table A6 for a breakdown of the group sizes.
38 Keren 2014.
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The two-week period between Waves 1 and 2 was designed to prevent respondents from
thinking about their reported vote intention (in Wave 1) when reporting their vote intention
(in Wave 2) after exposure to the vignette. This reduced the probability of suppressing the effect
of a vignette as respondents attempt to appear consistent. Contrasting the change for each
treatment group against a control allows us to control for any universal changes in vote intention
in the intervening two weeks.
RESULTS
In the ﬁrst wave, 38.2 per cent of respondents indicated they would vote to remain in the EU,
43.9 per cent indicated they would vote to leave, and 17.9 per cent indicated that they did not
know or would not vote. In the second wave, among those in the control group (who were not
exposed to any arguments), these results changed slightly to 37.1 per cent, 44.0 per cent and
18.8 per cent, respectively. To illustrate the magnitudes of the shifts across the two waves,
Appendix Figure A1 shows the ‘ﬂows’ from Remain/Leave/Don’t Know in Waves 1 and 2 for
the control group and the two most extreme treatment groups: those exposed to three pro-EU
arguments and those exposed to three anti-EU arguments.
To quantify and test the statistical signiﬁcance of the average change in referendum vote
intention before and after respondents were exposed to a particular combination of the
arguments, we estimate the following:
Δvotei = α + βtreatmenti + ϵi
where Δvotei is the change in vote intention from Waves 1 to 2 for respondent i; and treatmenti
is a binary variable equalling 0 if the respondent was in the control group and 1 if the
respondent was exposed to that particular combination of arguments. Respondents exposed to a
different combination of arguments were not included in this particular estimate. Separate
equations were estimated for changes in vote between Remain and some other vote (Leave or no
vote), and for changes in vote between Leave and some other vote, and between no vote and
some other vote. In each case, the coefﬁcient β is the estimate of the average change in vote
intention for those exposed to the combination of arguments, relative to the control group. This
is our estimate of the effect of the vignette. Doing this for each of the eight possible
combinations of arguments gives us an estimate of the effect of each of the eight vignettes.
Figure 1 plots the estimated effects of each vignette on Remain and Leave vote intention (the
full model estimates are provided in Appendix V).39 Exposure to three pro-EU arguments
produced a statistically signiﬁcant (p< 0.05) increase in support for remaining in the EU and a
decrease in support for leaving the EU. The increase in the Remain vote was 5.2 percentage
points and the decrease in the Leave vote was 3.6 percentage points. There was no
corresponding statistically signiﬁcant effect for the three anti-EU arguments. None of the
vignettes that contained any combination of anti-EU arguments produced a statistically
signiﬁcant effect on referendum voting intention. Meanwhile, in addition to a positive effect
from the three pro-EU arguments, the ‘pro-cultural, pro-economic, anti-political’ vignette
produced a statistically signiﬁcant change in the vote. It increased public support for Remain
and decreased support for Leave by 3.1 percentage points. Other vignettes that included pro-
and anti-EU arguments did not produce a statistically signiﬁcant effect.
39 The results do not change if we drop all respondents in the eight treatment groups who took less than
90 seconds to complete the whole test and therefore may have not read the vignettes carefully.
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Having determined that some vignettes that included pro-EU arguments produced statistically
signiﬁcant results, we then speciﬁcally estimated the effects of different vignettes depending on
the number of pro- versus anti-EU arguments. We separately estimated the effects of all
vignettes with three pro-EU arguments, vignettes with two pro- and one anti-EU argument,
vignettes with one pro- and two anti-EU, and vignettes with three anti-EU arguments. Doing so
allowed us to further examine the differential effect of pro- and anti-EU frames, and to compare
the effect of exposing respondents to non-competing frames (all negative or all positive) to that
of exposing respondents to competing frames with different weights placed on each side of the
argument. Figure 2 reveals again how the vignette with three pro-EU arguments produced a
statistically signiﬁcant effect, as did vignettes with two pro- and one anti-EU arguments (our full
results are reported in Appendix V). These latter vignettes increased public support for
remaining in the EU by a statistically signiﬁcant 2.3 percentage points. Their effect on support
for Leave was not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, vignettes that were predominantly pro-EU in
tone had a statistically signiﬁcant effect on referendum vote choice, while vignettes that
conveyed anti-EU messages did not.40 This is consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Does this mean that anti-EU arguments had no effect? We cannot reject the null hypothesis
that anti-EU arguments had no effect, while we can reject the null hypothesis that pro-EU
arguments had no effect. To test whether this is because anti-EU arguments have no effect,
rather than because we do not have the power to detect their effect, we provide a test of the
following null hypothesis: vignettes with two or more pro-EU arguments have no more of an
effect (in the positive direction) than those with two or more anti-EU arguments (in the negative
Pro Cultural, Pro Economic, Pro Political
Pro Cultural, Pro Economic, Anti Political
Anti Cultural, Pro Economic, Pro Political
Anti Cultural, Anti Economic, Pro Political
Pro Cultural, Anti Economic, Pro Political
Pro Cultural, Anti Economic, Anti Political
Anti Cultural, Pro Economic, Anti Political






















Fig. 1. Difference-in-differences effects of the treatments
Note: the ﬁgure shows the effect of a treatment on the change in support for Remain (Leave) relative to the
change in support for Remain (Leave) in the control group. The full results are in Appendix Table A4.
40 If we examine the effects of each argument separately (averaging over the other arguments with which it is
combined), we see that each of the pro-EU arguments increases the level of public support for Remain (p < 0.1)
– see Appendix Table A6. In the case of the political pro-EU argument, there was also a decrease in support for
Leave. Overall though, there is little to distinguish the effects of the different pro-EU arguments. The main
distinction is between pro- and anti-EU arguments, with little evidence that the latter had an effect.
Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes toward EU Membership 9
direction). This is a test of the difference in the magnitudes of anti-EU vignette effects against
the pro-EU vignette effects. At the 0.05 level (one-sided), we can reject this null hypothesis for
the proportion indicating that they would vote Remain (z score = 0.046; p = 0.04).41 For the
Remain vote, we have evidence that the magnitude of the effect of pro-EU arguments was
greater than the effect of anti-EU arguments and, in fact, no evidence that anti-EU arguments
had any effect. Overall, this is strong evidence for our suggestion that anti-EU arguments (on
average) had no effect while pro-EU arguments did.
Result 1: consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis that priced-in considerations will not have an
effect, anti-EU frames have less of an effect than pro-EU frames.
Figure 2 also reveals that while a purely pro-EU vignette affected the proportion indicating
they would vote Remain or Leave, a vignette containing two pro-EU frames and one anti-EU
frame had less of an effect. Further, a vignette containing only one pro-EU frame and two anti-
EU frames had no effect. The effect of the pro-EU frames was reduced when competing anti-EU
frames were combined in the vignette.42
Result 2: consistent with our second hypothesis, when there are competing frames, the effect
of each frame is mitigated, resulting in weak effects.
Next, to examine the effect of prior attitudes on the effectiveness of pro- and anti-EU frames,
we conducted two tests. First, we examined how effects differed among those who previously
declared moderate feelings towards the EU, those who said they held extremely negative
feelings and those with extremely positive feelings. The left panel of Figure 3 plots the
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2 Pro / 1 Anti
1 Pro / 2 Anti






















Fig. 2. Difference-in-differences effects of the relative volume of arguments
Note: the ﬁgure shows the average effect of the relative volume of Pro/Anti EU arguments on the change in
support for Remain (Leave) relative to the change in support for Remain (Leave) in the control group. The
full results are in Appendix Table A6.
41 We cannot reject the null hypothesis for the proportion indicating they would vote to leave (z score=
− 0.011; p = 0.62) or who did not know how to vote (z score= − 0.035; p = 0.245). To reduce standard errors,
we include in the analysis the following pre-treatment variables: age, social class, region, party ID and EU
attitudes in Wave 1.
42 It is also possible that the weaker effect is due to fewer pro-EU arguments.
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distribution of EU attitudes by those who indicated that they intended to vote Remain, Leave or
Don’t Know in Wave 1. Attitudes were measured on a 0 to 10 scale with 10 indicating the most
positive and 0 indicating the most negative attitudes towards the EU. The negative end of the
spectrum (0–3) was almost entirely populated by those who intended to vote Leave and the
positive end of the spectrum (7–10) was almost entirely populated by those who intended to
vote Remain. The moderate values (4–6) were a mixture of all three positions, with the centre
dominated by those who did not know how they would vote.
On the basis of this distribution, we deﬁned three groups of individuals based on their EU
attitudes: anti-EU extremists, EU moderates and pro-EU extremists.43 Figure 3 presents the
estimated effects of the vignettes on these three groups of individuals. We see that, as before,
anti-EU arguments did not have any effect. However, either three or two pro-EU arguments
increased the Remain vote among pro-EU extremists and EU moderates but not among the anti-
EU extremists. This increase in the Remain vote came largely through a decrease in those
indicating they did not know how they would vote. As expected, those with priors consistent (or
at least not inconsistent) with the frames were most affected by them.
Somewhat counter to expectations, there was some effect of the pro-EU frames on anti-EU
extremists. This effect was to decrease the Leave vote by increasing those who did not know
how they would vote. What we are observing is a limitation on the effect of a frame depending
on the strength of the individual’s priors. Those who had the most negative EU attitudes could
be moved from a Leave vote to an undecided position, and those with the most positive EU
attitudes could be moved from an undecided position to a Remain vote. However, individuals
with extreme (pro- or anti-EU) attitudes were unlikely to be moved all the way from a Remain
to a Leave vote or vice versa.
Our second test of how prior attitudes moderate the effectiveness of pro- and anti-EU frames
examined how the effects of the vignettes differed by partisan identity. Figure 4 Panel A shows
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EU moderate Anti-EU extremist Pro-EU extremist
Fig. 3. Extremists and moderates
Note: the left-hand ﬁgure shows the distribution of respondents on a 0–10 Anti-/Pro-EU scale. The right-hand
ﬁgure shows the average effect of each group of treatments on the change in support for Remain/Don’t
Know/Leave relative to the change in support for Remain/Don’t Know/Leave in the control group. EU
moderates were coded at points 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; Anti-EU extremists at points 0, 1, 2, 3; and Pro-EU extremists
at points 7, 8, 9, 10. The full results are in Appendix Table A12.
43 For the estimation we overlapped the categories, so that 0–3 = anti-EU extremists, 3–7 = EU moderates,
and 7–10 = pro-EU extremists. We did this so that the three categories were broadly the same size and also
because it is unclear whether positions 3 and 7 are ‘moderate’ or ‘extreme’.
Impact of Campaign Effects on Public Attitudes toward EU Membership 11
identiﬁers. Conservative identiﬁers were not affected by pro-EU arguments; they were only
moved away from Remain and towards Leave by the combination of three anti-EU messages.
Labour identiﬁers, however, were moved by pro-EU arguments but not anti-EU arguments. The
combination of either two or three pro-EU arguments moved Labour supporters away from
saying they don’t know how they would vote and towards voting Remain. This is consistent
with our expectations that those who identiﬁed as Labour would have prior attitudes that made
them more susceptible to pro-EU frames, and that those who identiﬁed as Conservative would
have prior attitudes that made them more susceptible to anti-EU frames.
Finding 3: in support of our third hypothesis, frames consistent with prior beliefs have
stronger effects.
Finally, we examined education as a moderator of the effects of the vignettes. We made the
assumption that those with higher levels of education would, on average, have high levels of
political knowledge.44 As shown in Figure 4, Panel B, we found that three or two pro-EU
arguments increased the Remain vote only among those with the lowest levels of education
(<17 years).45 There were no other effects for the higher levels of education, except for a
decrease in Remain and an increase in Leave due to three anti-EU arguments among the middle
education category (17–19 years). To the extent that education correlates with level of political
knowledge, it appears as though those with lower levels of political knowledge were more likely
to be affected by frames that made information available and accessible.
Finding 4: consistent with Hypothesis 4, the effect of both pro- and anti-EU frames is
strongest for those with the least knowledge/education.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have sought to build and expand upon existing research on persuasion and
framing effects, on public attitudes toward the EU, voting behaviour and referendums. Our
experimental design allowed us to test for the effect of ‘real-world’ arguments on both sides of
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Remain LeaveDon't Know Remain LeaveDon't Know
A B
Fig. 4. Difference-in-differences effects by subgroup (A). By party support (B). By age when ﬁnished
education
Note: each ﬁgure shows the average effect of each group of treatments on the change in support for Remain/
Don’t Know/Leave relative to the change in support for Remain/Don’t Know/Leave in the control group.
The full results are in Appendix Table A13.
44 Carpini and Keeter 1997; Luskin 1990.
45 Due to larger standard errors, only the vignette with three pro-EU arguments results in a statistically
signiﬁcant decrease in the Leave vote among this group.
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the referendum campaign that attempted to inﬂuence the vote through an array of pro-EU or
anti-EU messages. Our main ﬁnding is that, in one of the most Eurosceptic states in the EU, pro-
EU arguments had the potential to signiﬁcantly increase support for remaining in the EU, while
anti-EU arguments had less potential to impact support for either remaining or leaving. Our
results suggest that in more recent years the well-rehearsed arguments about the perceived costs,
risks and threats from the EU became ‘priced in’ to the national debate about continued EU
membership. Having experienced several decades of a Eurosceptic tabloid press, an established
current of Conservative Euroscepticism and the rise of the Eurosceptic radical right UKIP, it is
perhaps not surprising that participants in our survey were less strongly inﬂuenced by prominent
Eurosceptic arguments than hitherto less well-known messages about the beneﬁts of EU
membership. In contrast, our results suggest that communicating the claimed beneﬁts and
advantages of EU membership to an electorate that had long been noted for its instinctive
Euroscepticism might have had a signiﬁcant impact on the overall vote.
In terms of testing theories of campaign effects, our results suggest that even though
campaign effects are generally expected to be small when the issue(s) at stake is(are) highly
salient, under conditions of information asymmetry coupled with low partisan cuing, the
potential for a campaign effect in a single direction is substantial. The one-sidedness of the
potential effect is important because it is under these circumstances that a campaign can have a
decisive effect on the outcome. Our results are also important because they demonstrate that the
high salience of the issues at stake in a campaign does not necessarily mean that all information
is already available and accessible and that the electorate is immune to the way in which an
argument is framed. Important campaign effects are still possible in referendums on highly
salient issues.
In terms of shedding light on the power of arguments used in the UK referendum and
similar referendums in the future, our results suggest that certain groups might have been
especially receptive to pro-EU frames, notably Labour Party supporters, people under
26 (see Appendix VI), people with lower levels of education, and those undecided about their
EU referendum vote. Our results also suggest that pro-EU arguments weakened opposition to
the EU among the most fervently committed Eurosceptics and increased support for Remain
among more moderate voters. While we ﬁnd little evidence that pro-EU arguments resulted in
‘direct switching’ between the two camps, our results suggest that the campaign to keep the UK
in the EU held important advantages, if it had focused on a clear and consistent pro-EU
message.
Given that public attitudes toward EU membership were highly polarized and ﬁnely balanced
before the referendum, such that the way the respective cases were framed could have made all
the difference, our results suggest that it might have been a mistake for the Remain campaign to
focus primarily on the potential economic costs of leaving the EU – which the Leave campaign
dismissed as ‘Project Fear’ – rather than making a positive case for remaining in the EU. That
said, it is important to note that the effectiveness of pro-EU arguments is mitigated when they
compete with anti-EU considerations. Therefore, a pro-EU campaign would have had to
dominate the anti-EU message in order to be effective. Further, it must be acknowledged that a
Conservative Party leadership that had been critical of the EU for three decades could not have
credibly led such a strong pro-EU Remain campaign. This credibility trap might be absent in
other EU member states facing possible in/out referendums, where elites could perhaps make
pro-EU economic, political or cultural arguments. However, anti-EU arguments may still be
effective in countries that have not experienced the UK’s long tradition of Euroscepticism.
Overall, an important implication of our work is that in the context of information asymmetry
and weak partisan cues, it is valuable to identify which arguments have become commonplace
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and which have not. Commonplace arguments may be effective at holding public opinion in
place, but will be ineffective at shifting opinion during a referendum campaign. Arguments that
have been typically understated have the potential to deliver a substantial impact.
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